Generation and Analysis of Attack Graphs  by Wang, Chunying et al.
Procedia Engineering 29 (2012) 4053 – 4057
1877-7058 © 2011 Published by Elsevier Ltd.
doi:10.1016/j.proeng.2012.01.618
Available online at www.sciencedirect.com
Available online at www.sciencedirect.com
 




2012 International Workshop on Information and Electronics Engineering (IWIEE) 
Generation and Analysis of Attack Graphs 
Chunying Wanga, Ning Dua, HuijingYanga 
a
Department of Software Engineering, School of Software, Harbin University of Science and Technology, Harbin, China 
 
Abstract 
An integral part of modeling the global view of network security is constructing attack graphs.  Construction by 
hand, however, is tedious, error prone, and impractical for attack graphs larger than a hundred nodes. In this paper we 
present an automated technique for generating and analyzing attack graphs. We base our technique on symbolic 
model checking  algorithms, letting us construct attack graphs automatically and efficiently. We also describe two 
analyses to help decide which attacks would be most costeffective to guard against. We implemented our technique in 
a tool suite and tested it on a small network example, which includes models of a firewall and an intrusion detection 
system.
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1. Introduction 
As networks of hosts continue to grow in size and complexity, evaluating their vulnerability to attack 
becomes increasingly more important to automate. There are several tools, such as COPS [2] and Renaud 
Deraison’s Nessus Security Scanner [1],that report vulnerabilities of individual hosts. To evaluate the 
vulnerability of a network of hosts, however, we also have to analyze the effects of interactions of local 
vulnerabilities and find global vulnerabilities introduced by the interconnections between hosts. a typical 
process for vulnerability analysis of a network proceeds as follows. Fist, we determine vulnerabilities  of 
individual hosts using scanning tools, such as COPS and Nessus Scanner. Using this local vulnerability 
information along with other information about the network, such as connectivity between hosts, we then 
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produce attack graphs. Each path in an attack graph is a series of exploits, which we call atomic attacks, 
that leads to an undesirable state, e.g. a state where an intruder then produce attack graphs. Each path in 
an attack graph is a series of exploits, which we call atomic attacks, that leads to an undesirable state, e.g. 
a state where an intruder has obtained administrative access to a critical host. We can then perform further 
analyses, such as risk analysis [4],reliability analysis [3],or shortest path analysis [5],on the attack graph 
to assess the overall vulnerability of the network. 
Constructing attack graphs is a crucial part of doing vulnerability analysis of a network of hosts. 
Construction by hand, however, is tedious, error-prone, and impractical for attack graphs larger than a 
hundred nodes. Automating the process of constructing attack graphs also ensure that the attack graphs 
are exhaustive and succinct. An attack graph is exhaustive if it covers all possible attacks, and succinct if 
it contains only those network states from which the intruder can reach his goal. 
2. Attack models and attack graphs 
Although our primary interest is in multi-stage cyber-attacks against computer networks, we define the 
attack graph formalism abstractly as a scenario graph for a model where agents attack and defend a 
complex system. An attack model W = (S, τ,{s0}g; S,S,D) is a B¨uchi model representing a set of three 
agents I = {E,D,Sg}. Agent E is an attacker, agent D is a defender, and agent S is the system under attack. 
The specifics of how each agent is represented in an attack model depend on the type of the system that is 
under attack; in Chapter 8 we specify the agents more precisely for network attack models. 
An Attack Model is a formal representation of security related attributes of the attacker, the defender 
and the underlying system. Formally, Definition 1. Let AP be a set of atomic propositions. An Attack 
Model is a finite automaton M = (S, τ, s0, l), where S is a set of states, τ ⊆ S × S is the transition relation, 
s0 ∈ S is the initial state, and l : S → 2AP is a labeling of states with the set of propositions true in that 
state. A state in the model is a valuation of variables describing the attacker, the defender and the system. 
The transitions in the system correspond to actions taken by an attacker which lead to a change in the 
overall state of the system. The starting state of the model denotes the state of the system where no 
damage has occurred and the attacker has just entered the system using an entry point. As an example, if 
we consider the case of a computer network Attack Model, a state represents the state of the intruder, the 
system administrator and the network of computers. The transitions correspond to actions of the attacker 
such as running a network scan, probing a computer for vulnerabilities and exploiting vulnerabilities to 
get more privileges on that computer. 
An Attack Graph is a subgraph of an Attack Model, which consists of all the paths in an Attack Model 
where the attacker finally succeeds in achieving his goal. Formally, 
Definition 1. Let AP be a set of atomic propositions. An Attack Graph or AG is a finite automaton G = 
(S, τ, s0,E, l), where S is a set of states, τ⊆S × S is the transition relation, s0∈S is the initial state, E⊆S 
is the set of error states, and l : S→2AP is a labeling of states with the set of propositions true in that state. 
Given an Attack Model, model checking techniques are used to generate Attack Graphs automatically. 
The negation of the attacker’s goal is used as the correctness property during model checking. These 
properties are called security properties. An example of a security property in computer networks would 
be the intruder cannot get root access on the main web server”. A model checker is used to find out all 
states in the Attack Model where the security property is not satisfied. We call these states error states, 
comprising set E. An Attack Graph is a subgraph of the Attack Model which only contains paths leading 
to one of the error states. [6,7,8] describe the details of the algorithm to construct an Attack Graph, given 
an Attack Model and a security property.132 V. Mehta et al. 
In order to be able to find the reachability probability of various states in an Attack Model, we 
associate  probabilities with  transitions  in  the model. We call the resulting model a  Probabilistic  Attack 
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Model. Formally, 
Definition 2. A Probabilistic Attack Model is a 4-tuple M = (S, τ, s0, l), where S is a set of states, τ : S 
× S → [0, 1] is the transition relation such that ∀s∈S,∑s’∈S τ(s, s’) = 1, s0∈S is the initial state, and 
l : S → 2AP is a labeling of states with the set of propositions true in that state. Generally, a node in the 
attack graph represents an exploit and an edge represents either a condition or an available 
exploit or the privilege gained after the application of the exploit.  
 
3. Analysis of  attack graphs 
 
Qnce we have an attack graph generated for a network with respect to a given safety property, the user 
may wish to probe it for further analysis.  
Given a fixed set of atomic attacks, not all of them may be available to the intruder. Can we find a 
minimal set of atomic attacks that we should prevent so that the intruder fails to achieve his goal? To 
answer this question, we modify the model slightly, making only a subset of atomic attacks available to 
the intruder. For simplicity, we nondeterrninistically decide which subset to consider initially, before any 
attack begins; once the choice is made, the subset of available atomic attacks remains constant during any 
given attack. We ran the model checker on the modified model with the invariant property that says the 
intruder never gets root privilege on host ip2: 
AG(network. adversary. privilege<network.priv.root) 
The post-processor marked the states where the intruder has been detected by the IDS.The result is 
shown in Figure 1. The white rectangles indicate states where the attacker had not yet been detected by 
the intrusion detection system. The black rectangles are states where the intrusion detection system has 
sounded the alarm. Thus, white leaf nodes are desirable for the attacker in that the objective is achieved 
without detection. Black leaf nodes are less desirable-the attacker achieves his objective, but the alarm 
goes off. 















Figure 1: Attack graph 
 
The root of the graph in Figure 2 has two subgraphs, corresponding to two subsets of atomic attacks that 
will allow the intruder to succeed. In the left subgraph the sshd buffer overflow attack is not available to 
the intruder; it can readily be seen that the intruder can still succeed, but cannot do so while remaining 
undetected by the II3S.In the right subgraph, all attacks are available. Thus, the entire attack graph 
implies that all atomic attacks other than the  sshd  attack are indispensable:  the intruder  cannot  succeed 
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without them.The analyst can use this information to guide decisions on which network defenses can be 
profitably upgraded. 
  The white cluster in the middle of the figure is isomorphic to the scenario graph presented in Figure 2; 
it shows the ways in which the intruder can achieve his objective without detection (i.e., all paths by 












Figure 2:  Attack graph analysis 
 
Checking every possible subset of attacks is exponential in the number of attacks. In the next 
subsection, we show that finding the minimum set of atomic attacks which must be removed to thwart the 
intruder is in fact NP-complete.Then in the following subsection we also show how a minimal set can be 
found in polynomial-time. 
 
4. Test results 
 
We have applied NetSPA in one field test deployment and successfully discovered a misconfigured 
firewall. We have also verified our scaling assumptions by testing against simulated networks. 
We have tested our prototype on a small operational network. The network has 252 hosts, 3,777 ports, 
and 8,585 vulnerability instances. No credentials were modeled. The prototype used Nessus scans of the 
four links shown and copies of the rulesets of the two firewalls. The field test results were computed on a 
laptop with a Pentium-M 1.6Hz processor and 1GB of main memory, running a 2.6 Linux kernel. We 
have used anonymized hostnames and IP addresses. During normal network operations, a computer from 
the external network should be able to reach server01.example.gov on the internal network only via 
SMTP. 
NetSPA’s Perl frontend converted the source data to NetSPA’s internal binary format. The firewall 
rulesets and Nessus scans were automatically read and interpreted. All of the vulnerabilities were read 
and classified as in [9].The entire import stage required 24 seconds. 
Once converted, the network is read into the C++ stage of the prototype. This stage computes 
reachability, generates the MP attack graph, computes automated recommendations, and creates the 
simplified MP attack graph. It writes the two graphs to disk in the DOT language [10] and the 
recommendations as text. When the attacker is hypothesized on the “external network” segment of the 
network, the entire time for load, computation, and write was 0.5 seconds. 
The field trial’s results fuel optimism in the prototype and its utility. We are working to conduct 
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additional field trials on larger, more complicated networks. 
5. Conclusion 
The paper offered the approach and software tool for vulnerability analysis and security level 
assessment of computer networks, intended for implementation at various stages of a life cycle of 
computer networks. Offered approach is based on construction of attack graphs and computation of 
different security metrics. 
The suggested approach possesses the following peculiarities: 
• Usage for security level evaluation of integrated family of different models based on expert knowledge, 
including malefactor’s models, multilevel models of attack scenarios, building common attack graph, 
security metrics computation and security level evaluation; 
• Taking into account diversity of malefactor’s positions, intentions and experience levels; 
• Usage (during construction of common attack graph) not only of the parameters of computer network 
configuration, but the rules of security policy used; possibility of estimating the influence of different 
• configuration and policy data on the security level value; 
• Taking into account not only attack actions (which use vulnerabilities), but the common actions of 
legitimate users and reconnaissance actions which can be realized by malefactor when he gains certain 
privileges on compromised hosts; 
• Possibility of investigating various threats for different network resources; 
• Possibility of detection of “weak places” (for example, the hosts responsible for a lot of attack routes 
and the highest quantity of vulnerabilities); 
devoted to improving the models of computer attacks, the algorithms of attack graph generation and 
security level evaluation differing by accuracy and complexity, and experimental assessment of offered 
approach. 
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